From the archive
2014 Facebook award · In-Store Sales2015 BrightWhistle joins Influence Health2019 Healthgrades acquires Influence Health

Company / Healthcare marketing / No. 01

BrightWhistle made the click count

Hospitals wanted more patients. BrightWhistle connected the ad to the next step - and discovered that even good data needs someone willing to act on it.

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In 2014, a company that helped hospitals find patients won a Facebook competition for “In-Store Sales.” BrightWhistle had entered a category whose name sounded better suited to shopping bags than health systems. Its example was Piedmont Healthcare. Its argument was that an advertisement could begin a patient relationship, and that the relationship could be measured. The category mismatch was revealing: hospital marketing was borrowing the machinery of consumer commerce.

The story in three clicks
  • Healthcare campaigns, relevant landing pages and patient remarketing, sold as software or a managed service.
  • Named customer: Piedmont Healthcare. Buyer: Influence Health, in 2015.
  • The enduring lesson: useful measurement still needs a person who acts.

A hospital walks into a retail category

BrightWhistle’s award announcement reported returns above 10:1 for several Piedmont service lines. That is a striking claim, with a narrow boundary: selected campaigns, reported by the company. It does not establish an average return for every customer. Still, it explains the attraction. A marketing department could discuss patients and revenue alongside impressions and clicks.

The work involved Facebook advertising, paid search and remarketing to people already connected with a provider. Hospitals and physician networks were buyers; the company also addressed insurers, accountable care organizations, clinical research organizations and selected healthcare agencies. BrightWhistle occupied the space between a campaign agency and a software vendor, with healthcare as its organizing discipline.

The destination was the product

Founded in Atlanta in 2010 by Greg Foster and Chad Mallory, BrightWhistle paid attention to what happened after an advertisement. Its early system generated landing pages matched to particular ads. Relevant content and a form gave an interested visitor somewhere useful to go. The underlying idea was wonderfully practical: the promise made by the ad should survive the click.

The early acquisition route
  1. 01Relevant adA service catches someone’s attention.
  2. 02Matching pageThe destination continues the same conversation.
  3. 03Lead formInterest becomes a possible next step.
The click has arrived. Now give it somewhere sensible to go. A simplified view of the early workflow.

The 2011 account also supplied an unusually concrete commercial detail. Managed-service customers paid 10–15% of advertising spend, plus a monthly fee per site. Seed financing of $1.1 million was intended to help turn the service into licensable software. Those are historical terms, describing an early business model.

A price with a date attached10–15%

of ad spend + a monthly site fee
Reported managed-service pricing, July 2011.

By the 2015 acquisition, customers could choose SaaS or a fully managed offering. Agencies could license the platform for their own healthcare clients. The customer could buy a tool, or buy help doing the work.

A narrow market, a wider machine

Healthcare specialization gave BrightWhistle a specific sales argument. It combined advertising technology with an understanding of provider marketing, rather than asking a hospital to assemble everything itself. The company described its offering as HIPAA compliant and emphasized direct access to Facebook’s and Google’s advertising APIs. These were contemporary product claims; they belong to that period’s platform and product arrangements.

There was a larger system taking shape around the ads. A February 2012 collaboration with MEDSEEK connected patient acquisition with that company’s engagement and analytics capabilities. A reseller agreement followed in July. In August 2014, an integration with Medicom Health Interactive’s EVALIA assessments aimed to connect campaigns with identifying and engaging people at risk.

BrightWhistle was learning to sell a sequence: find interest, make contact, keep the relationship moving. In its April 2014 announcement, it reported tripling revenue from 2012 to 2013 and a customer roster representing nearly fifty leading hospitals. It also added healthcare technology executive Scott McFarland as COO. Growth meant more than writing additional campaign software; the company was adding operating experience to serve larger organizations.

A 2012 financing account compared BrightWhistle with lead-generation businesses such as Yodle. That comparison helps locate the company: its job was to bring prospective customers into contact with a provider. It was marketing infrastructure, with healthcare expertise built around the task. For a hospital buyer, the practical comparison was what the platform and its service team could deliver against an agency or an internal campaign operation.

The screenshot problem

Then comes the less tidy part of the story. In a 2018 interview, former BrightWhistle CTO Michael Sengbusch recalled marketers inspecting campaign dashboards, taking screenshots for presentations and leaving the underlying campaigns unchanged. The information had reached the customer. The work had stopped there.

Michael Sengbusch, former BrightWhistle CTO, pictured in coverage of his later company Eletype
A dashboard can make a fine slide. Michael Sengbusch wanted it to make something happen. Portrait published during coverage of his later startup, Eletype.

“Then it occurred to me - it wasn’t the data, it was the delivery mechanism.”

Michael Sengbusch · Hypepotamus, 2018

His subsequent company, Eletype, delivered distilled marketing insights through Slack. That was his later response to the problem, not a feature to retroactively assign to BrightWhistle. The distinction matters. BrightWhistle could have valuable technology and satisfied buyers while some users struggled to turn its measurements into decisions.

For anyone borrowing the approach, this is the useful constraint. Matching a campaign to its destination requires a relevant offer and somewhere to send the inquiry. Measuring the result requires reliable attribution. Improving it requires an owner who can change the campaign. If those conditions are absent, an impressive dashboard can become another reporting obligation. This is a lesson drawn from the account, rather than a documented explanation for every customer’s results.

A partner becomes the parent

Influence Health, formerly MEDSEEK, acquired BrightWhistle in February 2015 after almost three years of partnership. The announced plan was to combine its acquisition and engagement capabilities with a wider platform spanning print, email, social and the web. The collaboration had become a purchase.

The ownership trail continued. Healthgrades bought Influence Health in 2019. Later, the consumer Healthgrades.com business separated from the enterprise technology business, which became Mercury Healthcare. WebMD acquired Mercury in 2022. Keeping those branches separate prevents a familiar brand name from obscuring which business went where.

BrightWhistle’s portable idea remains small enough to use tomorrow: follow the customer past the advertisement. Make the destination relevant. Decide who owns the next action. The hospital won a place in the retail category because the commercial question was recognizable: once someone pays attention, what happens next?