Cesar Carvalho's company began with a scribble in the middle of a Harvard Business School strategy class. The case concerned Bally Total Fitness, a gym chain with lots of fixed costs and a permanent appetite for new members. Carvalho stopped following the class and started writing. What if people could buy access to different gyms without pledging themselves to one? Six months later, in 2012, he was out of Harvard and back in Brazil, turning the note into a company called Gympass.

The clean version of this story ends there: student has idea, student drops out, company grows. Carvalho's version is more useful because the idea from the classroom was wrong in several important ways. It imagined consumers as the buyer. It centered day passes. It treated fitness venues as the whole product. Even the wonderfully literal name would eventually become a problem.

He did not protect that first answer. He protected the frustration underneath it: access was rigid, fragmented and poorly suited to people whose days did not obey a single schedule. The distinction became his operating system. Products could be replaced. Buyers could change. A brand could be retired. The problem earned the loyalty.

Chapter one

A small city, then a very large bet

Carvalho grew up in Alfenas, in the southern part of Minas Gerais, Brazil. His grandparents had little formal schooling; one delivered milk and another farmed for subsistence. His parents became university teachers, the first generation of the family to complete higher education. The family lesson was plain: education could change the available future.

Young Cesar supplied a commercial footnote. He organized excursions and parties for friends and charged admission. He sold encyclopedias for extra cash. Later he moved to São Paulo, shared a student house and studied business at the Universidade de São Paulo. Before graduating, he consulted for small and medium-sized companies, saving enough for a six-month exchange in the Netherlands.

After university came AC Nielsen, CVC and McKinsey. Harvard followed. Leaving it might sound like a theatrical rejection of safe choices, but Carvalho is candid about the scaffolding beneath the leap. Harvard allowed him as long as five years to return. McKinsey offered one. His two co-founders committed alongside him, one leaving an MIT MBA and another turning down a Bain offer. Risk had not vanished; it had been made survivable.

“Still feels like it's day one.”Cesar Carvalho, on nearly thirteen years of building

His mother remained unconvinced by startup mythology. Even when the business was working and preparing to enter new countries, she encouraged him to sit Brazil's civil-service examinations. It is a fine family joke and a useful corrective. Every founder celebrated for taking a risk has relatives who would prefer a pension.

Cesar Carvalho seated by a window in a dark jacket
New York became the headquarters. The founder's operating language still carries the practicality of Minas Gerais.
The early machinery

No customers, one PowerPoint, many pamphlets

The founders raised $200,000 from friends and former colleagues while Gympass was still a presentation. Their proposition to gyms was deliberately low-risk: the platform would promote a venue and pay when it delivered a visit. Empty capacity could become revenue. Carvalho and his colleagues signed partners neighborhood by neighborhood, bought online ads and distributed pamphlets in the street. The future platform began with shoes on pavement.

There was a snag. Consumers were not arriving quickly enough. Then an executive at PwC asked whether the service could be offered to employees. The question introduced a third participant to what was already a difficult marketplace. Gympass now had to persuade venues, users and employers. It also gave the company something consumer day passes had not: an organization able to subsidize access, communicate the benefit and place it inside an existing community.

Carvalho's go-to-market filter was revealing. The team first approached companies known for treating employees well. Those organizations could understand the offer quickly, and their reputation made the next ring of customers easier to approach. Instead of pursuing size alone, Gympass pursued cultural fit and let credibility travel outward.

The first product had been a passport. The better business became a flywheel. Employers made access easier. More employees participating made the network useful. Partners received incremental visits and earnings, which attracted more partners, which increased choice. The consumer idea was not discarded so much as placed inside a stronger piece of machinery.

40K+corporate clients
5M+paid subscribers
100K+partners
1Bcheck-ins by Dec. 2025
The name catches up

Gympass becomes the wrong right name

By the time the pandemic closed physical venues, Gympass had become closely associated with in-person access. The company responded by adding digital partners. The offering widened across fitness, mindfulness, nutrition and sleep. Customers began pointing out the obvious: they were buying much more than a gym pass.

A descriptive brand had become descriptively inaccurate. This is an elegant corporate problem, the sort that only appears after something has gone well. Gympass was known. It was simple. It had accumulated recognition across multiple countries. It also kept explaining yesterday's product.

The replacement took roughly two years to find. In April 2024, Gympass became Wellhub, a name designed to accommodate a hub of different services. Carvalho treated the rebrand as an organizational change, not a graphics exercise. His maxim was crisp: decisions can be made at the top, but implementation happens from the bottom. Strategy needed translation, repetition and enough time for people to inhabit it.

“Decisions can be made top-down but they're implemented bottom-up.”Cesar Carvalho

He advises CEOs to think eight quarters ahead. The horizon explains the apparent contradiction in his style: an operator attentive to detail who is willing to accept short-term discomfort. A familiar name may help this quarter. A more accurate one may help the next eight.

Consumer day passes launch in São Paulo
An employer-funded model begins to emerge
The company reaches a reported $1.1 billion valuation
Digital partners broaden the in-person network
Gympass becomes Wellhub
One billion cumulative check-ins
A founder's useful disloyalty

Head, heart and the freedom to edit

Carvalho calls one co-founder the smartest logical thinker in the room. He describes the other as possessing an unusually large heart, a happy person whose example makes Carvalho want to improve himself. An interviewer once condensed the arrangement to “head and heart.” Carvalho agreed.

That little exchange offers a better picture of founding teams than the usual grid of functional skills. Gympass needed analysis and warmth, marketplace arithmetic and the patience to hear that a customer wanted a different company. The commitments of those co-founders also gave Carvalho confidence at the moment when his prestigious alternatives were still available.

His later reflections are strikingly free of founder infallibility. Carvalho has said the team took about three years to design a model that produced broader adoption. He identifies a common mistake in his own journey: becoming attached to a solution and then searching for a problem that justifies it. Most businesses, he argues, will not look the same after a decade as they did in the original imagination.

What builders can steal

  1. Name the enduring problem separately from the current product.
  2. Make early participation low-risk for every side of a marketplace.
  3. Recruit customers whose values make them credible references.
  4. Use safety nets to improve a bet, not to apologize for making it.
  5. When a brand shrinks the promise, familiarity has become a tax.

The company around him continued to grow. It became a unicorn in 2019. A 2023 financing valued it at $2.4 billion. By April 2026, Carvalho said Wellhub had more than 40,000 corporate clients, five million paid subscribers and a network exceeding 100,000 partners. The platform recorded its billionth check-in in December 2025.

Those figures tempt a heroic ending. Carvalho's own framing is more open-ended. He talks about daily habits, about companies taking responsibility for the conditions in which people work, and about wanting his children to inherit a better world. In Alfenas, Instituto Acredite supports promising children with scholarships and educational resources. Carvalho has said he marks major wins by bringing more students into the program. The family story that began with education changing one generation now loops forward.

Away from the office, he flies small planes and returns to Brazil each year. He has said that family and friends matter more than money. These details do not soften the operator so much as complete the logic. Wellhub's pitch is about making room for a fuller life. Carvalho's aspiration is to build the company without mistaking the company for the whole of one.

Fourteen years after that classroom note, very little of the first plan remains untouched. The buyer changed. The network changed. The headquarters moved from São Paulo to New York. The offering expanded. Gympass itself disappeared into a new name. Yet the original irritation survived: ordinary schedules should not make access needlessly difficult.

There is a kind of vanity in being consistent with your younger self. Carvalho chose the more productive pleasure of correcting him. The page of notes from Harvard did its job. It began an argument with reality, and reality kept winning.