LATEST / VK
AUG 2026 · H1 REVENUE RUB 81BN   /   JUL 2026 · RUSTORE SALE ANNOUNCED   /   JUN 2025 · RUB 112BN EQUITY RAISED

COMPANY PROFILE / THE ATTENTION ECONOMY

VK has the audience. Now comes the arithmetic.

From Mail.ru to video feeds and business software, VK has built a place in millions of Russian daily routines. A costly expansion and a major share issue explain why its next test is turning attention into durable earnings.

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A mailbox is a modest place to start an internet empire. It gives people a reason to return tomorrow. Add friends, music, videos, schoolwork and the office calendar, and tomorrow becomes most of the day. VK has spent nearly three decades assembling those reasons to return. Its harder assignment is making all that activity pay.

The Russian technology group reported 81.5 million daily users across its services in the fourth quarter of 2025. Its reach encompasses the VKontakte social network, Odnoklassniki, Dzen, Mail and a growing business software operation. Yet the same company needed a 112 billion ruble share issue in 2025 to reduce debt. Few corporate stories put the distance between popularity and financial comfort so plainly.

By August 2026, the numbers were improving. First-half revenue reached 81 billion rubles, up 12%, and adjusted EBITDA reached 14 billion. VK had also announced the sale of RuStore, the app store it helped build. The interesting question is no longer how many things VK can own. It is which ones deserve the next ruble.

The mailbox came before the social network

There are two origin stories hiding inside the initials. The corporate lineage begins with Mail.ru in 1998, through Port.ru, founded by Eugene Goland, Michael Zaitsev and Alexey Krivenkov. VKontakte, the social network associated with Pavel Durov, arrived in 2006. Confusing the two makes the group look eight years younger and erases the email business that helped establish its audience.

Mail.ru Group eventually bought the whole social network, paying $1.47 billion for the remaining 48% in 2014. In 2021, the parent adopted the VK name. The familiar consumer brand became the sign above a much bigger shop. That is why a conversation about VK can jump from a friend's photographs to database software without changing companies.

The holdings have never stood still. In September 2022, Yandex completed a transaction that sent Dzen and its news aggregation business to VK and Delivery Club in the other direction. VK moved further into publishing and attention; Yandex added food delivery. The exchange made strategy visible in the assets each side chose to keep.

A day's worth of reasons to log in

For consumers, VK is a collection of practical and recreational habits. VKontakte supplies communities and social publishing. Odnoklassniki offers another social audience. Dzen distributes articles and video. Mail handles email, while Cloud Mail stores personal files. VK Music, VK Video and VK Clips compete for listening and viewing time. A person can encounter several of these businesses without thinking about their common owner.

Shared infrastructure helps connect the collection. VK ID lets people sign into different services with one account; VK Mini Apps allows services to run inside a host platform. Marusia adds a voice interface. The proposition is convenience: fewer separate accounts and more things available where people already spend time.

The customers paying the bills are more varied than the users. Advertisers buy attention. Subscribers pay for selected consumer services. Parents buy education through businesses such as Uchi.ru and Tetrika. Companies buy cloud capacity and workplace software. Creators and merchants use the audience as a route to income. Each group wants something different from the same corporate address.

HOW A VISIT BECOMES A BUSINESS
01
ReturnMail · friends · entertainment
02
DiscoverFeeds · creators · communities
03
SpendAds · subscriptions · purchases

Consumer attention supports several revenue streams. Enterprise software adds a different customer and buying cycle.

VK's declared strategic ambition is to make daily life more convenient and support digital transformation for businesses, society and the state. That last customer matters. Reuters described VK as state-controlled in 2025, and German policy institute DGAP has examined its political connections and role in Russia's information environment. This is a business whose domestic position cannot be explained by product design alone.

The year attention got expensive

The financial warning arrived before the audience disappeared. In 2024, revenue rose 23% to 147.6 billion rubles, while the net loss reached 94.9 billion. Operating costs were 152.6 billion. VK said spending had increased on attracting creators, producing content, technical equipment, development and staff. More activity on the screen came with more obligations behind it.

Those figures describe different things. Revenue is income from sales; a net loss includes expenses and accounting items beyond day-to-day operations. Adjusted EBITDA strips out further items and is the profitability measure VK emphasizes. None can safely stand in for the others. A busy video platform can generate rising advertising revenue while the group still loses money.

2024 / RUB BILLION

More revenue. A bigger bill.

Revenue147.6
Operating costs152.6

Operating costs exceeded revenue. The separate net loss was RUB 94.9 billion; it is not the difference between these bars.

Management's response was concrete. The June 2025 placement raised 112 billion rubles through additional shares, with proceeds directed toward reducing debt. Existing shareholders received proportional pre-emption rights. This was financing from equity holders, not money earned from advertising. For holders who did not participate, the enlarged share count meant a smaller percentage ownership.

By the end of 2025, VK reported adjusted EBITDA of 22.6 billion rubles and net debt, excluding leases, of 82 billion. The subsequent first-half 2026 release showed further operating progress. It also reported a 328 million ruble net profit for the second quarter specifically. A profitable quarter deserves its own label; it is not proof that every longer reporting period was profitable.

Sell the delivery business. Keep the shopping impulse.

The Ozon relationship offers a useful explanation of VK's commerce ambitions. In June 2025, VKontakte and Ozon announced a test of a tool connecting marketplace sellers with bloggers and community authors. Creators could choose products through VK AdBlogger, publish promotional content and receive a percentage of sales generated through it.

The distinction is practical. VK does not need to own the warehouse to make a shopping recommendation valuable. The creator supplies an audience and a reason to care; the marketplace supplies products and fulfillment. A reader can move from a post to a purchase, while the seller gets an outcome that is easier to measure than a vaguely encouraging impression count.

For a merchant, the copyable idea is to reward an observable result and make the route from recommendation to checkout short. It still depends on the product, the creator's credibility and the economics of the commission. A large audience with little buying intent can produce a handsome traffic chart and a disappointing sales ledger.

“direct the received funds to lowering its debt burden.”

VK, announcing its share-issue plan in March 2025

RuStore tells a different story about the boundary of the group. Launched in May 2022, it offered a Russian app-distribution channel. On July 16, 2026, VK announced a deal to sell 100% to Dmitry Pankrushev, chief executive of the developer company. It belongs in VK's history, but a current product list needs to mark that announced ownership change.

The other cloud has an IT department

Cloud Mail and VK Cloud sound like siblings you might confuse at a party. Their customers would not. Cloud Mail is personal file storage. VK Cloud sits in VK Tech's business offering, alongside VK WorkSpace, Tarantool and other data and enterprise products. The distinction separates a consumer saving photographs from a company operating applications.

WorkSpace bundles corporate email, calendars, messaging, videoconferencing, tasks and collaborative tools. The problem it addresses is familiar: teams lose time moving between disconnected systems. A shared suite can bring those interactions together. Its buyers include managers and IT administrators who must consider deployment, data protection and how employees will actually use the software.

VK Tech generated 18.8 billion rubles in 2025 revenue, up 38%, and reported 31,900 customers. That is smaller than the social and media operation, but it brings a different set of purchasing decisions into the group. Business software must justify itself through reliability and useful work, not simply a longer session in a feed.

Yandex is a relevant domestic alternative across advertising, entertainment and cloud services. Enterprise buyers also compare specialist suppliers; consumers compare individual apps. VK's advantage is the breadth of its Russian audience and product connections. Its disadvantage is the same breadth turned into management work: many services, separate competitors and no guarantee that strength in one category transfers to the next.

Two people working together at a table in a VK recruitment photograph
The whiteboard has competition. Paper and pencils make an appearance in VK's recruitment photography. Even an internet group occasionally works offline.

What the code gives away

The public repositories provide a more revealing window into expertise than a list of fashionable technologies. VK's KPHP compiles a subset of PHP into a native binary. Open-sourced in 2020, it reflects the demands of an established service trying to get more performance from its software. StatsHouse tackles monitoring; VKUI provides interface components.

There is a useful limitation attached to that inheritance. KPHP's documentation says it does not support every PHP feature and often requires existing code to be rewritten. An engineering team can examine and reuse the work, but should test compatibility before adopting it. A solution developed for VK's workload does not become universal just because the repository is public.

The company is also investing in a more consistent technical base. In February 2026, VK said it had hired 400 Go developers over two years, including 300 during 2025. An internal training program had taken 236 employees through company-specific engineering tasks; 85% moved into Go developer roles. Teaching around actual systems makes the training unusually concrete.

Four people embracing in a VK recruitment photograph
A social network, in person. VK's recruitment imagery takes togetherness literally. The company also advertises internal mobility and professional communities.

Its employer profile describes 24 professional communities, internal learning and the ability to move between teams. These are the company's account of working life, rather than a verdict on every employee's experience. Together with the open-source projects and retraining numbers, they show how VK presents its culture: technical problems are shared, and staff can build new specialties without starting over elsewhere.

The lesson is selective. Copy the short path between useful content and a transaction. Copy training tied to real production problems. Be more cautious about copying a sprawling product portfolio supported by a huge inherited audience and substantial shareholder financing. VK's next chapter depends on the unglamorous arithmetic beneath the feed: what each return visit earns, and what the company spends to secure it.